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ABSTRACT 
 
The link from deposit insurance to bank risk taking has been widely analysed, but has been the subject of 
relatively little empirical work. This work contributes to the existing literature by exploring 
microeconomic aspects of the deposit insurance–bank risk relationship. It employs four of the five IMF 
core financial soundness indicators, using data from financial statements for 914 banks in 64 countries. It 
also disaggregates deposit insurance by individual design features. Results, generated using GMM, 
suggest that deposit insurance mainly affects bank risk through its relationship with profitability and 
asset quality. An optimal deposit insurance system might have features such as voluntary membership, 
no cover for foreign currency deposits, no coinsurance, be unfunded, and administered by a private sector 
manager with the insurance cost borne fully by the private sector. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the US introduced deposit insurance in the 1930s, some form of deposit insurance has been widely 
adopted by both advanced and developing countries to aid the stability of their banking systems. There is 
also a political benefit to the adoption of the insurance scheme, in that it protects small depositors and 
improves opportunities for smaller banks to compete with larger institutions for deposits. Underlying the 
attraction of deposit insurance is the fact that although some bank failures are good for market discipline, 
systemic failures may fuel banking crises. Haldane et al (2001) show that these can entail cross-country 
spillovers and huge economic costs. According to Barrell et al (2004), the high cost of financial 
instability is the main reason for concern in terms of financial turbulence. 
 
The goal of achieving and maintaining the health and soundness of financial institutions and markets has 
become a top priority for policymakers, and deposit insurance has been a part of the “safety net” in most 
countries (Demirguc Kunt et al 2004). However, deposit insurance has also been subject to criticism. 
Even though it has been credited with solving the inherent “runs problem” of deposit banking, it has also 
been accused of introducing a costly side effect – moral hazard, which could in itself lead to failures as a 
result of riskier banking practices. It is this dilemma that has caused deposit insurance to come under 
public scrutiny and has given rise to widespread discussions of deposit insurance reform (Demirguc Kunt 
et al 2006). 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to such discussions via an empirical investigation of the link from deposit 
insurance to bank risk using Financial Soundness Indicators. In doing so, we seek to give plausible 
answers to such questions as whether deposit insurance indeed leads to increased risk taking by banks, 
thereby causing moral hazard, how individual design features of deposit insurance impact the risk taking 
appetite of banks and accordingly what the best choices may be for policymakers. 
  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 is a theoretical framework. This section outlines the basic 
theory, highlighting the major concepts and reasoning on deposit insurance. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the existing analytical literature in this area. Section 3 introduces the data and variables, 
while Section 4 outlines the econometric methods. Section 5 provides results and an interpretation, while 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The characteristics of demand deposits give rise to important incentives for both the depositor and the 
bank management. Demand deposits have infinitesimal maturity and are also governed by the sequential 
service constraint (SSC) where the bank pays its depositors on a “first come first served basis” as 
highlighted in Greenbaum and Thakor (2007). This creates the incentive for the depositors to monitor the 
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bank so as to be the first in the withdrawal queue in case of risk of failure. These characteristics are 
intended to give incentives for managers to act in depositors’ interests. However, the non-tradability and 
debt-like nature of demand deposits as well as asymmetric information also creates a risk of runs when 
depositors fear that solvency is compromised. The classic “sunspots” theory of bank runs by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), suggests that such runs are random. It assumes that individuals are risk averse and 
uses a two-period world. When individuals invest, they can choose to liquidate their investment and 
consume in the present period with little or no payoff from investment if they perceive that they will 
“die”. Or they can leave their investments running and reap a greater payoff at maturity if they perceive 
that they will “live”. This choice is especially made possible by the penalty-free infinitesimal maturity 
characteristic of their deposit contracts.  
 
The banks seek to structure their assets in such a way that a certain amount of the bank’s projects are 
liquidated to pay off the “diers” who will break their contracts at the end of the first period, or they 
simply hold liquid assets to meet this requirement. This is based on the assumption that the livers will all 
wait till maturity –the end of the second period.  But if a supposed “liver” feels strongly that other 
“livers” will panic and break their contracts as well, they will go on to withdraw. Logically, all other 
“livers” will follow suit, meaning that the bank will have to prematurely liquidate their assets to pay 
them off, forcing the bank to sell their assets at “fire-sale” prices and becoming insolvent.  
 
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) suggest that runs are a consequence of adverse information and not 
random events. Similar to the sunspots theory, there is a two- period world consisting of “diers” and 
“livers” but the “livers” are in two categories: those informed of the end period value of the banks assets 
and the uninformed ones. If the informed livers perceive at the first period that the second period value of 
the banks assets is favorable, they will wait for their contracts to mature. However if they perceive 
otherwise then it will only be rational for then to terminate their contracts and consume now instead. 
Uninformed “livers” are left to infer outcomes from the length of the withdrawal queue. Bearing in mind 
that the queue comprises of both “diers’ and informed “livers”, they assume then that the longer the 
queue the greater the number of informed “livers” who wish to withdraw their funds and as such the 
outlook of the bank is not favorable. They quickly join the queue, causing a bank run. Furthermore, the 
adverse information discovered by depositors’ monitoring is sometimes noisy, causing bank runs to 
occur when they should not. This in turn leads the banks to liquidate profitable projects. This 
overdisciplining of the banks is ex post socially wasteful. 
 
A bank panic basically results when there is an element of systemic risk likely to affect all banks. This is 
usually caused by failure of a major bank hastening the failure of other banks (contagion effect) arising 
in turn from direct counterparty risk exposures or concerns over balance sheet similarities under 
information asymmetry. This situation may occur in an economic recession as stated in Gorton (2002) or 
an unstable political situation. Empirical researchers like Bordo (1986), Calorimis and Gorton (1991), 
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Calorimis (1993) among many others have established that panics are preceded by a change in the risk 
perceptions of depositors reflected in the deposit/currency ratios of countries. 
 
Bank runs and panics can be short circuited by a safety net for depositors, such as deposit insurance. It is 
a system usually run by the Finance Ministry, guaranteeing the nominal value of deposit claims on 
insured banks. The lender of last resort facility is an alternative form of the safety net and is operated by 
central banks, using their ability to produce “high powered money” to lend at their discretion to illiquid 
but solvent institutions. Referring the safety net concept to the models above, if the “liver” was 
guaranteed repayment of his deposits and his additional payoff from investing till the end of the second 
period, he would not be forced to terminate his contract prematurely, irrespective of whatever actions are 
taken by other “livers”. If this is applicable to all “livers” in the bank, then there will no bank run. 
Equally, if the uninformed “liver” in the adverse information theory was in any way assured of his due 
repayment at the end of the second period, he would wait until then and would not care about the length 
of the withdrawal queue and the number of informed “livers” in it. Similarly, the informed “livers” will 
also not be disturbed about the future value of the banks assets. With this assurance in place, there will be 
no occurrence of a bank run. 
 
That the introduction of deposit insurance significantly changed depositor behavior is empirically 
reflected in the period between 1935 - 1972 after deposit insurance was introduced, when there were 
many instances of failed corporate liabilities in the US, none of which gave rise to a banking panic, see 
Greenbaum and Thakor (2007). This obviously was as a result of the guarantee provided by deposit 
insurance to the depositors. Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2005) note that even though deposit insurance can be 
either implicit or explicit, virtually all countries around the world that have adopted deposit insurance 
implement an explicit scheme. But there also arise adverse incentives for the bank, which can be 
conceptualized using an option framework.  
 
If v is the asset value of a bank and D represents its debts, a bank can buy an equity put option to insure 
against bankruptcy, so as to MAX (0;V-D), when D > V and V-D = -K. The maximum gain for a bank 
from owning a put option equals the exercise price (D) of the option if the stock price (V) falls to zero, 
which in turn implies that the firms asset value has fallen below its liabilities. The firm then exercises the 
put and gains the negative difference between its asset value and its liabilities (-K). In this context, 
deposit insurance can be viewed as a put option for a bank to insure against runs. It is the right to sell the 
value of the end-of-period assets of a bank for the amount the banks owes as debt.  Normally, a bank 
maximizes its payoff when the end of period value of its assets is greater than its debt. In this situation, 
its payoff is the difference between the value of its assets and its debts. This difference is shareholders’ 
wealth. If however, the value of its debts exceeds the value of its assets, the bank becomes distressed and 
then the deposit insurer takes over the bank’s assets, ensures that it pays out the total value of the debts to 
the creditors and incurs a loss of the difference between the value of the banks total debt and its end of 
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period total value. This loss to the deposit insurer is the maximized gain to the bank from exercising the 
put option. 
 
The presence of deposit insurance therefore gives the bank the option of exercising the put if the value of 
the debt becomes greater than the value of its assets at the end of the period. This implies that even 
though the bank has more debt than it can pay, by exercising the put option, the deposit insurer carries on 
the extra debt and the bank is insured against a run. However, if at the end of the period the value of the 
bank’s assets turns out greater than the debt it owes its depositors, it leaves the option unexercised and 
neither gains nor loses.  
 
Like any form of insurance, a bank insures its deposits by paying premiums to the institution formed and 
assigned the sole duties of writing put options for the banks. In the US prior to 1933, private 
arrangements like the Commercial Bank Clearing Houses were present and carried out some of the duties 
of a central bank and they helped diminish the possibilities of bank panics by issuing Clearing House 
Loan Certificates to member banks who needed extra cash to meet up to their deposit withdrawals. 
However private arrangements cannot totally eliminate runs and panics because the amount of assistance 
offered is limited by the capital of the organization and as such, depositors cannot always be sure that 
their banks will be bailed out when they are in need. This factor retains the incentive for depositors to 
monitor their banks, the very incentive that breed runs and panics. To truly give depositors the degree of 
assurance they expect to stop unnecessary monitoring of banks requires a system of deposit insurance 
that is managed by a very credible body such as the US government. 
 
A possible agency problem arises from the incentive that a put–owning bank might have to increase the 
value of the options. Here lies the key of the accusations on deposit insurance of accentuating moral 
hazard by banks through increased risk –taking activity, as follows: If the bank has the incentive to max 
(0; V-D), when D>V and D-V= K. If B represents the deposit insurer’s losses, and we assume that B = -
K, then D-V= B. If so, as the value of the banks share price tends to zero, at which point the bank 
maximizes it’s deposit insurance put option, the higher the value of B and the more losses accrued by the 
deposit insurer. Hence, while the banks maximize their payoffs from increasing the negative difference 
between their asset value and their liabilities by increasing their risks, they also increase the loss incurred 
by the deposit insurer. There is also an incentive for banks to reduce their capital and increase asset 
volatility.  The deposit insurer has to offset this loss from the excess of the premiums paid by the bank in 
distress. If the troubled bank (or the totality of banks) have not paid the right amount of premiums in the 
past, the deposit insurance agency will have to pay depositors from the government’s pocket – taxpayers’ 
monies. The basic problem is that usually the price of deposit insurance is invariant to risk, whereas risk-
taking incentives could be partly or wholly neutralized by risk related insurance premia. Deposit 
insurance agencies must ensure that premiums are properly priced and risk-sensitive if it is to achieve the 
goals for which it is instituted. They must also find a way to punish high-risk banks and compensate 
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low–risk ones. This gives a rationale for bank regulation and supervision, in the sense that the multi-
faceted problems that can arise from information asymmetry, externalities and the exploitation of market 
power, justify the need for the regulation of the banking system, a need that is increased by the mispriced 
safety net as argued by Mishkin (2000). Banks can only be regulated by actually monitoring them and 
overseeing by whom and how they are operated. This is where the bank supervision comes to play. 
Supervision helps to detect and deter high-risk banks and save the deposit insurance system from the 
inherent incentive problem (Crockett 2001). Regulation and supervision are major counterparts to the 
safety net in achieving global financial stability. The internationalization of financial markets gave birth 
to the need for a standardized agreement for bank regulation, such as the successive Basel capital 
accords. 
 
Besides such microprudential regulation, there has also been a growing recognition of the need for 
macroprudential indicators of the stability of the system as a whole. Lindgren et al (1998), define a sound 
banking system as one in which most of the banks that account for the majority of the system’s assets 
and liabilities are solvent and are likely to remain so. Financial Soundness Indicators, are categorized 
using the CAMEL framework as ratios that act as measures of bank risks that help determine the 
soundness of the financial system. They are referred to by Evans et al (2000) as the indicators of the 
health and stability of financial systems. Slack (2003) shows the five major categories and their 
corresponding bank ratios and also claims that these ratios are widely used by bank supervisors to 
evaluate individual banking institutions.  
 
The Financial Soundness Indicators are grouped into two categories mainly to avoid having a one – size- 
fits- all approach but rather to introduce flexibility in the choice of indicators used to check country-
specific vulnerabilities. Carson et al (2001) show the categories as first, the “core set “of indicators 
which are mainly for the purpose of periodic monitoring, focus on the five main aspects of vulnerability 
on institutions in the banking sector. Then there is the “Encouraged set” which includes more indicators 
for deposit taking institutions and other institutions and market participants that are of direct relevance in 
assessing financial stability. See the table below for the full list. Developments in such indicators provide 
a measure of whether the risk-taking incentives of deposit insurance are operative. 
 
2 RECENT ANALYTICAL WORK ON DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND BANK 
SOUNDNESS 
 
Most theoretical work done in the area of deposit insurance tends to confirm that deposit insurance is 
responsible for the increased risk taking activity in banks arising via moral hazard, where FSF (2001) 
defines moral hazard as the incentive for additional risk taking that is often present in insurance contracts 
and arises from the fact that parties to the contract are protected against loss. Garcia (2001) also mentions 
that moral hazard occurs when protection causes the beneficiaries of insurance (in the case of deposit 
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insurance, this means depositors, bank owners, managers and supervisors, and even politicians) to be 
careless in their approach to bank soundness. 
 
 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detriagiache (2000) point out that according to economic theory, while deposit 
insurance may increase bank stability by reducing self-fulfilling or information-driven depositor runs, it 
may also decrease bank stability by encouraging risk-taking on the part of banks. They also reason that 
the absence of an explicit deposit insurance system creates some degree of uncertainty amongst 
depositors as to how quickly their losses will be covered in case of a mishap and hence may create an 
incentive for depositors to monitor banks, hence reducing moral hazard but also recognize the objection 
that small depositors may not be effective bank monitors. 
 
Wheelock and Kumbhakar (1995) note that deposit insurance subsidizes risk taking, therefore creating 
moral hazard in that banks with insured deposits will find it optimal to assume more risks than they 
would otherwise. Grossman (1992) goes a step further to acknowledge that it is by charging a flat rate 
premium that deposit insurance creates a moral hazard problem, since banks do not bear the costs of 
engaging in risky behavior on their cost of funds, they are therefore encouraged to take more risks than 
they ordinarily would. He adds that since governments often provide 100 percent depositor protection, 
especially to large banks where a loss could have industry wide repercussions – “the too big to fail” issue 
- deposit insurance becomes a sure guarantee in the strict sense of the word and so generates problems 
not usually found with private insurance where there is usually risk sharing (suchnrning to  as excesses).  
 
The issue of regulatory or political capture is an agency problem arising from conflicts of interests 
amongst deposit insurance scheme owners who obviously want cheaper schemes and scheme managers 
who are more interested in prolonging their personal careers or safeguarding their relationships with 
existing political regimes as highlighted by Beck (2002) 
 
In a different perspective, Park (1997) derives a model based on differential calculus to study the risk 
taking behaviour of banks under regulation. His model is unique because it explicitly incorporates 
regulation, whereby regulators sort risky banks based on capital ratios and asset portfolios. Park finds 
that with the multidimensional approach to bank regulation, it is difficult to predict the effect of a change 
in regulation on the bank risk variables, for instance, tighter capital standards can cause some banks to 
lower their capital ratio and compensate for such action by lowering their portfolio of risky assets or as 
most banks find optimal, maintain capital ratios higher than what regulators require, but greatly increase 
their portfolio of risky assets. 
 
Jeitschko and Jeung (2004) buttress the point above by suggesting that when a bank is driven by 
managerial incentives, its risk may increase as its capitalization increases, since its choice of assets set is 
ordered by a high risk –high return criterion. They arrive at this suggestion while investigating the 
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relationship between bank capitalization and risk taking behaviour. They generate a similar empirical 
model and carry out a similar theoretical analysis as Park (1997) above but incorporate the incentives of 
three agents - the deposit insurer, the shareholder and the bank manager and different levels of preferred 
asset risk. 
 
Boyd and Rolnick (1998) suggest that the costs of containing moral hazard will have to be shared by the 
insured and that surely, bank owners must carry a much greater share of the risk of loss as well as 
depositors, but to a lesser degree. Most countries that have explicit deposit insurance today; exclude 
inter-bank deposits from protection and other countries even limit coverage to accounts of households 
and not-for-profit organizations. This however has the power to defeat the whole purpose of deposit 
insurance in the first place, especially as the performance of an explicit system may seem adequate in 
“normal times” but fail woefully during crisis periods when partially insured depositors rapidly withdraw 
deposits, precipitating bank runs. Then the authorities often have to provide blanket guarantees which 
covers all depositors. 
 
Turning to empirical work, in a seminal paper, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detriagiache (2000) carry out an 
empirical investigation on the effects of deposit insurance on bank stability, by estimating its 
contribution to the probability of a systemic banking crises occurring, using a multivariate logit model on 
a panel of 61 countries between the periods of 1980 and 1997. They find that the presence of an explicit 
deposit insurance alongside other macro variables like low GDP growth, declining terms of trade, the 
real interest rate and inflation significantly increased the chances of having systemic banking problems. 
They further indicate that an explicit deposit insurance scheme could also cause an increase in the “clean 
up costs” of a potential crisis adding that since they find an inverse correlation relationship between the 
length of crisis episodes with the costs associated with it, then it may be that quick clean up rescue 
operations require huge budgets and as such cost more. 
 
Laeven (2001a) shows that the opportunity cost value of deposit insurance service has a predictive power 
in forecasting bank distress and as such is a proxy for bank risks, especially for banks with a 
concentrated ownership structure, high credit growth and for small banks as well. 
 
In his study of the relationship between bank risk taking activity and their governance structure, Laeven 
(2002a), argued that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicates that a bank takes excessive risks. 
Using market capitalization and dividend yield data for 144 exchange listed banks in fourteen emerging 
market countries for the period between 1991 – 1998, he derived an extension of the Merton (1977) 
deposit insurance algebraic model with “cost of deposit insurance” as a proxy for bank risk. He obtained 
results suggesting that banks with more concentrated ownership take on greater risks than their 
counterparts with a dispersed ownership structure and that his bank risk proxy had some power in 
predicting bank distress. 
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In contributing to the moral hazard debate, Gueyie and Lai (2001) study the conditions for risk shifting 
from the five biggest chartered banks in Canada to the Canadian flat rate deposit insurance system based 
on seven measures of bank risk and utilizing both market and accounting data from 1956 to 1982. They 
propose two main risk avenues – increasing bank asset risk and decreasing market and book value capital 
ratio. The bank asset risk is measured by variables such as  (a) the standard deviation of equity returns, to 
capture a banks total risk, (b) the market return for the bank for market risk (c) the unexpected yield on 
the interest rate index to indicate for interest rate risk. The ratio of the product of the number of shares 
outstanding and the stock price to total assets is used to capture the market/book value ratio, while the 
book value of equity to total asset measures the book value capital ratio. They carried out both statistical 
mean difference tests as well as cross – sectional time series analyses and found that the implicit 
volatility of bank assets have indeed increased, with capital ratios also decreasing. However they do not 
find sufficient manifestations for risk shifting from banks to the deposit insurance agency (moral hazard) 
since their results show that banks maintain their overall risk posture at constant levels by offsetting 
increases in asset risk by decreases in leverage. 
 
In a sequel paper to Gropp and Vesala (2001), using the same methodology, but with a more 
homogeneous sample of 73 European union Bank level data, Gropp and Vesala (2004) study the effect of 
the presence of explicit deposit insurance on charter values (to capture bank risk taking),  choosing to use 
the Tobin’s Q value as a proxy for bank charter values , and show that the establishment of explicit 
deposit insurance in the European Union, significantly reduces the degree of risk taking by banks. 
Gropp and Vesala (2001) study the effects of explicit deposit insurance on bank behaviour and the ‘too- 
big-to-fail problem for 128 European banks, between 1991 and 1998. They carry out OLS regression 
analyses, using both cross sectional and time series data for the presence of explicit deposit insurance 
from the Demirguc-Kunt at al (2005) deposit insurance database and bank specific book and market data 
from the Bankscope and Datastream databases. They find that deposit insurance may reduce moral 
hazard if non-deposit creditors are left out. This is because by so doing, it permits monitoring by the 
uninsured subordinated debt holders. They also find that a limited safety net reduces risk taking by small 
banks with lesser charter values and that the risk practices of the too-big-to-fail banks remained 
unchanged in the presence of deposit insurance. However, it may be impossible to attribute increased 
bank riskiness to banking regulation alone, since bank principals can act in many different ways, in 
response to an existing or new regulatory environment.  
 
The design of a deposit insurance scheme has also recently proven to be an important factor in the state 
of health of the financial system, as shown by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) who investigate 
empirically, linkages between deposit insurance and market discipline as indicated by the growth rate of 
deposits and interest expenses. Using a cross-country balanced panel of 52 countries between 1990 and 
1997, they execute pooled OLS estimations. They find that apart from an explicit deposit insurance 
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system, other design features of a deposit insurance system directly influence the level of market 
discipline exerted on the banks by their depositors respectively. They conclude that higher coverage and 
government funding of the deposit insurance system reduce market discipline by lowering bank interest 
expenses while increasing deposit rates, and that joint management of the deposit insurance scheme may 
improve market discipline by having the opposite effect on bank deposit and interest expenses. 
 
Beck (2002), in his detailed non- empirical exposition of the unique ‘private club’ structure of the 
German deposit insurance system finds that a deposit insurance system that is designed to be funded and 
managed by the banks themselves without any form of governmental support or contribution except in 
the extreme case of systemic baking sector collapse can be very effective as in the case of Germany. 
Kane (2000) contends that contrary to the “one- size- fits –all” premise, individual country safety nets 
should be designed to take into account the large differences that exist across countries in the degree of 
transparency the banks afford their depositors.  
 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000), the higher the level of institutional quality in a 
country, the lesser the level of moral hazard and the more effective their deposit insurance system. Even 
in the case of Germany, Beck (2002), where a completely privately funded and managed scheme has 
seemed to work so well, it has also been judged to be so successful as a result of a higher than average 
level of institutional quality. The same goes for the rest of the European Union where Gropp and Vesela 
(2004) identify a stronger institutional structure as being a party to the success of explicit deposit 
insurance in comparison to emerging market countries.  
 
The implication is that ideally, explicit deposit insurance should only be instituted in countries with a 
relatively strong institutional environment. Laeven (2002b) uses daily stock market capitalisation, 
ownership structure and annualised yields data from the DataStream and Bloomberg database for 144 
exchange –listed banks across 14 developed and developing countries to compare the opportunity cost 
value of explicit deposit insurance in countries that practice it with countries that have implicit deposit 
insurance systems in place. He develops a theoretical model which is a combination of the Merton (1977) 
put option model for deposit insurance and the Black Scholes option pricing model. His results identify 
that an explicit deposit insurance system raises the opportunity cost value of deposit insurance, but that 
presence of a sound legal system and proper enforcement of rules reduces the adverse effects of explicit 
deposit insurance on the opportunity cost value of deposit insurance services. Kane (2000) mentions that 
political accountability is needed to ensure that the public’s duty to value the risk taking ability of banks 
as well as resolving financial difficulty promptly, evolves efficiently and effectively. 
 
Explicit deposit insurance is not however confined to advanced countries. Using a dataset of more than 
170 countries worldwide which have adopted a deposit insurance system up to 2003, Demirgüç-Kunt et 
al (2004) employ the multivariate logit estimation method to study the spread of explicit deposit 
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insurance systems around the world and the determinants of the design features of a deposit insurance 
package. They find that even after controlling for macro economic shocks, severity of crises and 
individual country characteristics, the desire to copy the “developed country style” of regulation 
influences greatly the decision of a country to adopt a very generous deposit insurance scheme. This 
explains the widespread growth of explicit deposit insurance in recent years, especially amongst 
developing countries. They explain that this desire is largely attributed to external pressure, especially 
immediately after those countries have experienced banking instability. They are also concerned that 
such ‘crisis pressure” is likely to result in deposit insurance design features that poorly control moral 
hazard. 
 
Some particular institutional variables have been found to be directly linked to some of the individual 
design characteristics of deposit insurance. Kane (2004) shows that the extent of deposit insurance 
coverage tends to be higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the scene, and also 
higher in countries where the depositors are poorly educated. This is in support of the “Private Interest” 
theory that riskier banks always pressure politicians for self-enriching regulations like allowing an 
extensive level of coverage as shown by Kroszner and Stratmann, (1998).  
 
Regarding the optimal design of deposit insurance, it is important to distinguish the two main purposes of 
deposit insurance (Blair et al 2006). First there exists deposit insurance for systemic risk protection by 
removing the incentive for the development of costly bank runs that interfere with their financial 
intermediation duty and second, deposit insurance for consumer protection acts by providing a minimum 
level of guarantee to depositors against the consequences associated with the failure of a bank. Striking 
the proper balance for a deposit insurance package that fulfills both requirements and at the same time 
eliminating or at best reducing to the barest minimum, the adverse incentive effects on financial stability 
from the actions of both the insured banks and insured depositors is the problem at hand. 
 
In the recent past, it has been widely suggested that components of the financial systems of nations need 
reform. Deposit insurance is surely one such component. For countries considering the establishment or 
reform of a deposit insurance system, there exists no real consensus on which way to go about it, 
however, it is obvious that deposit insurance alone cannot increase financial system stability. Without a 
sound system of banking supervision that includes strong capital standards as well as mechanisms for 
enlisting help from the market in imposing discipline on participants, deposit insurance and other 
elements of the financial safety net (i.e. lender of last resort) will be ineffective and may increase the 
costs and pain of resolving a financial crisis, especially if the system is liberalized. 
 
In most countries, interest rate controls, branching and interstate banking restrictions have been lifted and 
the barriers between commercial and investment banking are fast eroding. Banks are consolidating in 
record numbers. The size and complexity of the largest banks are growing. The problem is that the loss 
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of one of these banks (too big to fail), will pose a great systemic risk. Yet too much depositor protection 
can cause such banks to take too much risk. ` 
 
Cull (1998) explains that in all insurance pools, individual risk premiums are paid into a fund from which 
all losses are met, and a residual claimant loses money when losses exceed premiums, meaning a 
claimant that underprices risk, tends to go bankrupt. However, with the deposit insurance schemes of 
most countries, the residual claimant is a government agency with very different incentives, and if the 
premium paid by member banks cannot cover current fund expenditures, the taxpayer makes up the 
shortfall. Facing little or no threat of insolvency, there is little incentive for administrative agencies to 
price risk correctly. This situation leads to instability. 
 
According to Folkerts-Landau et al (1998),  “While the dangers of precipitating a general loss of 
confidence has frequently made it difficult to close large banks without fully compensating large 
depositors, it is almost always possible to make owners and large creditors bear a substantial part of the 
financial burden of losses”. One example is the UK, where the system till October 2007 increased 
depositors risk exposure, by low deposit insurance limits, coinsurance for insured depositors, and 
restriction of insurance coverage to particular class of depositors. This should induce depositors to 
increase their monitoring of banks and by means of their deposits and withdrawal activity to discipline 
and restrain risky banks. However, Northern Rock’s bankruptcy showed its limitations and the UK has 
now moved to a higher level of 100% cover for retail depositors. 
 
Some parties to the reform debate have suggested that banks be constrained to holding only safe assets – 
the “narrow bank approach as highlighted in Ely (1991).  Others maintain that a closer monitoring and 
pricing of bank risk should do the trick. Some others consider that banks in distress should be shut down 
before even their net worth falls to zero – the US “prompt corrective action”. However, Boyd and 
Rolnick (1998) warn that all of these recommendations may be infeasible and unnecessarily expensive to 
carry out.  
 
According to Garcia (2001), in order to avoid moral hazard, the deposit insurance system must be 
transparent, thus enabling bank customers to protect their interests. This means clearly specifying, what 
qualifies as an insured deposit and allowing the supervisors access to accurate and timely information on 
individual banks to institute prompt remedial actions and speedy intervention when necessary. They may 
also disseminate unclassified information to the public. She finds that excluding larger depositors and 
unsecured creditors from coverage, thereby exposing them to loss, will increase their participation in 
bank monitoring and as such increase the degree of market discipline. She advises on relatively low 
amount of coverage, in the region of two times GDP per capita for a start, which should not be indexed 
to inflation. 
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Even with the above guidelines, limited deposit insurance cannot maintain systemic stability in the face 
of shocks. As noted, in a systemic crisis, a full deposit guarantee can be essential. Typically, a full 
guarantee covers all bank debts. However Garcia (2001) agrees with other economists that protecting 
shareholders and subordinated debt holders is inappropriate, unless they carry no blame for the situation. 
She notes that in the context of a crisis, IMF staff advice is not to reintroduce a limited deposit insurance 
scheme until the banking system is fully restructured to acceptable standards of financial soundness. 
 
Gropp and Vesela (2004) propose “constructive ambiguity” as a measure to contain moral hazard in 
countries with weaker institutional quality. Probably, an amendment to the present Basel II will help.  
The development of a worldwide credit default swap market, which will help to create diversification in 
the specialist origination of bank loans, thereby reducing risk concentration and financial fragility is the 
answer. But with every powerful derivative instrument, comes the possibility of widespread abuse and 
risk as emerged from credit default swaps in 2007-8. Goodhart (1995) advises that perhaps what is 
needed most is greater transparency.  
 
This paper contributes to this small array of existing literature by aiming to discover the relationship 
between deposit insurance and its design features and bank risks based on balance sheet ratios that 
consist of the IMF FSI framework for bank soundness as proxies. 
 
3 DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
The data for deposit insurance and its characteristics used in this paper were collected from the 
Demirguc-Kunt et al (2005) World Bank deposit insurance database (see Obasi (2009) for details). A 
sample of 64 countries was employed as set out in Appendix Table A.2. The macroeconomic indicators 
were obtained from the World Bank development indicators database.  For the measures of bank risks 
(financial soundness indicators) and the bank specific variables, data from balance sheet statements of 
banks as posted in the Bankscope database was used. 
 
The selection criteria used for bank choice in each country was along similar lines that used by Cavallo 
and Majnoni (2002) but was slightly modified to ensure that we capture an adequate picture of each 
country’s banking system and to accommodate the dynamics of the data available. First, every country’s 
central bank was excluded from the sample. We then chose the 20 largest banks in terms of asset size in 
each country for countries with more than 50 banks, the 10 largest banks for countries with up to 50 
banks, the 5 largest banks for countries with less than 20 banks and all the banks for countries with 5 
banks or less in total, giving rise to total of 914 banks. 
 
We however made use of the unconsolidated statements of the banks as marked in the Bankscope 
database, to ensure uniformity and also include as much countries in the sample as possible. It is known 
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that the accounting practices of most countries across the world favors the reporting of unconsolidated 
financial statements. We are aware that this raises the double counting issue with subsidiaries but this is 
the trade off for an inclusion of a lot more banks and countries in the sample to ensure a truly bank based 
and cross-country investigation. We placed no restrictions on the inclusion of other kinds of bank-type 
financial institutions (other than the central bank) as long as they met the aforementioned requirements. 
With respect to data inconsistency in the Bankscope database, we eliminated all banks with less than 4 
years data of the 8-year sample. This study covers the period between 1995 and 2003 - the limit of 
availability of data in the Bankscope database. Data are summarized in the Appendix (Table A1.1). 
 
The dependent variables are bank balance sheet or profit and loss based ratios, which are proxies 
stipulated by the IMF as part of the “core” set financial soundness indicators (FSI’s), see Table 1 above. 
They were chosen because of their ability to reflect different measures of bank risks. Four of the five 
categories of FSI’s are represented in this work, namely Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Earnings and 
profitability and Liquidity (see Table 1). The fifth, which is sensitivity to market risk, is not employed as 
a result of the absence of any representative data. Poor disclosure levels prevent the use of information 
on banks foreign currency positions, duration of assets and liabilities as well as liabilities (tier 2 capital) 
as is required to obtain the ratio that indicates sensitivity to market risk. Although a limited amount of 
these data were found, it was so scanty that attempts to include them in any way in the regressions meant 
that we would have lost significant degrees of freedom, which resulted in a bias.  
 
The FSI variables are: 
 
LOANAST:  The ratio of total loans to total assets 
ROAA:  The ratio of the return on average assets 
LEVRATIO:  The leverage Ratio. (Total on-balance sheet assets to own funds*) 
LIQUID:  The ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
 
First, the ratio of loans to assets is a predictor of the quality of a bank’s assets and highlights the 
proportion of a banks total balance sheet asset that is issued out as loans (loans no matter how safe or 
highly rated, still carry a significant proportion of risk). Davis and Zhu (2005) suggest that loans carry a 
higher level of risk in comparison to other assets that may be in a banks’ asset portfolio such as 
government bonds etc. A clearer indicator could have been impaired loans or problem loan to gross loans 
ratio. However obtaining data for those variables across a range of countries proved very difficult. 
Second, the rate of return on average assets is a good indicator of the earnings and profitability of banks. 
It captures the risks associated with high leverage.  Third, the leverage ratio, the ratio of on – balance 
sheet assets to own funds is an indicator of capital adequacy and availability, which determines the 
robustness of banks to sudden shocks to their balance sheets. Fourth, the ratio of liquid assets to total 
                                                 
*Equity was used as a proxy for own funds because of unavailable data on total liabilities.  
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assets is the indicator of liquidity and can indicate excessive maturity mismatches by bank management 
and as such the ability of banks to withstand shocks. It can also reflect the degree of customer confidence 
in the long-term survival of a bank. An adverse trend in the leverage, return on average assets and 
liquidity ratios is a pointer to potential banking stress as a result of increased risk.  An increase in the 
loan to asset ratio is an early warning signal of risk to the soundness of a bank.  These ratios were 
calculated for all the banks chosen in each country and for all the years in the study. We now turn to the 
independent (control) variables. 
 
Macroeconomic variables 
As in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001), macroeconomic variables were included to control for the 
general state of the economy. This minimizes omitted variables bias. The lags of some of these variables 
were included at some point in the work to take into consideration the time delay in realizing their impact 
on the economy. STAGDEV, the Real GDP per Capita, captures the stage of general development of a 
country STAGFINDEV, the Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP, an indicator of the 
level of financial development of a country. GDPGROWTH, the rate of growth of Real GDP. 
INFLGROWTH represents the rate of change of the GDP deflator and REALINTRATE, the real short 
term interest rate. 
 
Bank-Specific variables 
As in Davis and Zhu (2005), some bank specific variables were also included, some of which were 
entered in lags to account for the simultaneity bias resulting mainly from the year-end nature of balance 
sheets, from which information on them have been obtained. They are INTMGNTA, the banks net 
interest margin which is the ratio of a bank’s Net interest revenue to total assets. It is an indicator of the 
banks price of loans. LOANGRTH is the real rate of growth of bank loans, a proxy for the credit risk of 
bank assets. 
 
Deposit Insurance variables  
Most earlier studies on deposit insurance cited above have constructed the dummy for the presence of 
deposit insurance as taking the value of 1 when there is explicit insurance and 0 for implicit or vice 
versa. We contend that the kind of insurance; whether implicit or explicit is a design feature and should 
not be used to capture the presence of deposit insurance at all. But equally because virtually all the 
countries in a deposit insurance system had all already adopted or changed from an implicit to an explicit 
deposit insurance system. Including a special variable for explicit or implicit deposit insurance design 
would have resulted in a near perfect collinearity. Accordingly our deposit insurance variables are as 
follows: 
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DI: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is a deposit insurance system in place in that     
year, in a particular country and 0 when there is none. This deposit insurance system presence variable is 
the major variable of interest in this study. 
COVER: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is a high level of coverage in that year, in 
a particular country and 0 when there low coverage. The IMF recommended best practice for the extent 
of coverage is two times a country’s GDP (Garcia 2001). I have therefore classified countries with higher 
coverage amount /GDP ratios than 2 as having high coverage and 2 or less as having low coverage. 
MEMBER: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is compulsory membership of a deposit 
insurance system in place in that year, in a particular country and 0 when there is voluntary membership. 
FORCURR: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when foreign currency deposits are insured in that     
year, in a particular country and 0 when they are not 
INTERBA: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when interbank deposits are insured in place in that     
year, in a particular country and 0 when they are not. 
COINSURE: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is a coinsurance practice (loss to both 
depositors and the deposit insurance fund) in place in that year, in a particular country and 0 when there 
is none. 
FUND: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is a funded deposit insurance system in place 
in that year, in a particular country and 0 when there is an unfunded one in place. . Demirguc-Kunt and 
Sobaci (2000) explain a funded system as one in which the member institutions make periodic 
contributions to an established fund, whereas an unfunded one has no permanently maintained funds in 
place. 
SOURCE: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the source of the funds come jointly from the 
public and private sector in that year, in a particular country and 0 the source is from solely the private 
sector. 
CENTADMIN: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the deposit insurance system is centrally 
administered by the public sector in that year, in a particular country and 0 when it is not. 
JOINTADMIN: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the deposit insurance system is 
administered jointly by both the public and private sector in that year, in a particular country and 0 when 
it is not 
PRIVADMIN: A dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is a deposit insurance system is 
administered by the private sector in that year, in a particular country and 0 when it is not. This variable 
was found to be homogenous across the sample and so was not included in the regressions. 
 
4 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
 
The major aim of this work is to find the effects of the presence of a deposit insurance system on the 
three measures of bank risks stipulated above. The econometric analysis follows closely the work of 
Davis and Zhu (2005). The fixed effects static model is stated below: 
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Yit = f (MACROt,  BANKit ,  DIVt  ,) + Eit.       (1) 
 
Where: 
Yit represents each of the dependent variables (the bank risk ratios). 
Macro is a vector of the macroeconomic variables stated above.  
Bank is a vector of all the bank specific variables 
 and  
DIV in this case stands for a vector of the Deposit Insurance presence variable and the variables 
representing the Deposit insurance design features. 
 
For robustness, a dynamic model, which includes the lag of the dependent variable as a regressor , is 
proposed as shown below: 
 
Yit = f (Y it-1, MACRO t,  BANKit  ,  DIVt  ,) + Eit.       (2) 
 
This estimation work seeks to detect whether the presence of a deposit insurance system in a country, as 
captured by the DI variable, affects the risk taking activity of banks, through its effects on the different 
measures of bank risk. Second we then investigate in detail how this happens, by analyzing the effects of 
all the design features (COVER, MEMBER, FORCURR, INTERBA, COINSURE, FUND, 
SOURCE, CENTADMIN, JOINTADMIN) that make up a deposit insurance system on the different 
bank risk variables, with a view to ascertaining if each of the design features influences a bank’s risk 
appetite. From this we also deduce whether the different design features of deposit insurance have effects 
on the bank risk variables that are independently and different from the overall effect of the total deposit 
insurance package. 
 
For the initial static model, we started by running a static panel data pooled OLS least squares regression 
for the base model with the deposit insurance system presence variable DI included. However, to ensure 
robustness to heteroscedasticity and possible endogeniety bias, we opt for a fixed effects model, which 
transforms the data in first differences, thereby removing the individual bank correlated effects with 
other regressors in the model. While re-estimating the differenced model, the transformed standard error 
term was also adjusted for possible bank specific serial correlation. Further, a Hausman specification test 
was also carried out between the estimates from the fixed effects model and those of the pooled OLS 
regression. A significant p-value is obtained in favour of the fixed effects model producing more 
efficient estimates. 
 
To assess the impact of the deposit insurance design features, we ran further regressions dropping the DI 
variables, but adding each of the design feature variables one at a time for subsequent regressions. This 
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helps to eliminate the effects of collinearity amongst variables in a model (which is common with 
difference transformations of dummy variables). We are also able to ascertain the individual effects of 
each of the design features.  Considering that there could be the possibility of the presence of the “end of 
year balance sheet bias” in the regression estimates as highlighted by Davis and Zhu (2005) as well as 
the chance that the bank risk variables could be explained by their lags, including the first lags of the 
dependent variable could further improve our model specification. We then propose the dynamic model 
shown above.  
 
We then repeated the same procedure above, using the robust Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. GMM estimators control for endogeniety on two levels. First, they are able to remove the 
inherent bank specific heterogeneity component of the error term. Second, they control for the possible 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, thereby generating far more robust 
estimates of the coefficients. GMM estimators also control for reverse causality among variables in the 
same model. Above all, it controls for any omitted variable bias in the models as shown by Kim and 
Frees (2006), which means that the GMM estimates are robust to the effects of any other explanatory 
variables not included in the model. This feature makes our method of running separate regressions with 
each of the design feature variables robust even though we are unable to include the other design features 
simultaneously in the model as controls. 
 
There are many variations of the GMM estimators, however we choose the GMM Style estimator 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), because it allows for the use of further lags of the dependent 
variable to construct a matrix of the maximum number of instruments without loss of generality (loosing 
data from early periods in the panel). The GMM style instruments include a combination of the second 
lag of the dependent variables as well as the first differences of the non- lagged regressors. The 
instruments we used are listed in Table A3 in the appendix. For each regression with a deposit 
insurance/design feature variable, we drop the corresponding differenced instrument from the regression. 
 
The estimations are carried out with the same procedure of deposit insurance variables as with the static 
model analysis. Correct GMM diagnostics include obtaining a p-value as close to 1 as possible for the 
Sargan test of overriding restrictions, which means that the instruments are valid. An insignificant p-
value for the test for 2nd order autocorrelation is also required indicating that the estimates are free from 
autocorrelation. A significant Wald Chi2 test statistic shows that it was correct to reject the null 
hypothesis that either of the joint variables or dummy variables are equal to zero. In summary significant 
Wald tests make the case for the fact that the model is not misspecified.  
 
We also experiment with a different variation of the GMM estimator called the IVGMM estimator where 
all regressors are differenced and the lagged difference of the dependent variable is instrumented with the 
second and third lag of the dependent variable. This estimation produces results that are similar to those 
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obtained from the GMM Style regressions. However we choose the former results since the IVGMM 
estimator is known to be biased in small samples due to loss data as highlighted by Girma (2008). 
 
We included time dummies in all estimations to account for the effect of common shocks on the 
variables. We also included country dummies to account for the different country dynamics in the panel 
and had individual bank dummies as well to control for the effect of the individual bank practices in the 
panel, irrespective of whether they belonged to the same country or not. Unfortunately, as a result of the 
transformations of the models needed to ensure that the results are more robust, it is impossible to 
estimate these models for the OECD and EME subgroups. Differencing and lagging of the deposit 
insurance binary variables makes them homogenous across the subgroup samples, leading to collinearity 
among panels. 
 
The results from the static model and those from the dynamic models are very similar and buttress our 
case for robust estimates. However, we choose the GMM regressions for the dynamic model as the most 
robust and the second - step results are reported in Tables 1.2 through 1.11 below. We tabulate the full 
results for the baseline model, but subsequently tabulate only the results for the different design features, 
especially as the effects of the other control variables remain the same across all the regressions even 
when we change the design feature variables. We see no reason to repeat the effects of the control 
variables each time. 
 
5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Results for both the dynamic GMM model estimations are tabulated in Tables 1.2 through 1.11, and the 
static estimates in Table 1.12. The columns record the estimates of all the regressions run for each of the 
four dependent variables, with each coefficient and p-value in the corresponding row of regressors. A 
summary is in Table 1.13. As noted, correct GMM diagnostics include obtaining a p-value as close to 1 
as possible for the Sargan test of overriding restrictions, which means that the instruments are valid. This 
tends to be obtained for all regressions except the loan/asset ratio. An insignificant p-value for the test for 
2nd order autocorrelation is also required indicating that the estimates are free from autocorrelation, also 
generally obtained. A significant Wald Chi2 test statistic shows that it was correct to reject the null 
hypothesis that either of the joint variables or dummy variables are equal to zero. In summary significant 
Wald tests make the case for the fact that the model is not misspecified. This is universally obtained. 
 
With reasonable diagnostics, we now consider the results. We reiterate that the main aim of this paper is 
to examine the effects that the presence of a deposit insurance system as presently designed around the 
world has on the financial health of banks as indicated by the Financial Soundness Indicators. This 
makes DI our main variable of focus in this paper, alongside all the other individual features of a deposit 
insurance system. 
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From the Baseline regression, as shown in Table 1.2, the present design of deposit insurance package as 
depicted by the  DI variable does not explain the level of a bank’s liquid asset in relation to its total asset 
portfolio. The same goes for the capital adequacy ratio, probably because banks are stipulated to keep a 
certain percentage of capital as reserves according to the Basel Accord . The loan/asset ratio is almost 
significant and positive at 10%, while the return on average assets ratio has a significant and negative 
relationship with the presence of deposit insurance. The implication is that the presence of a deposit 
insurance system generally affects banks risk mainly through its negative effect on bank profitability. 
This implies that it may create an incentive for bank personnel to fail to maximise profits or slack (be 
overly conservative) in investing in more profitable ventures to boost bank profitability or to be reckless 
in the issuance of loans, resulting in a high proportion of bad loans which in turn hurt bank profitability. 
The latter point is buttressed by the slight positive relationship between deposit insurance system 
presence and the loan to asset ratio we find. . The combination of a possible positive effect on the 
proportion of loans to assets banks issue and a negative effect on bank profits signals that the presence of 
deposit insurance may have a positive effect on the proportion of non-performing loans on the bank’s 
books. Unfortunately, we are not able to pursue this premise further due to unavailability of data on bank 
bad loans. However, we stress that the effects of the DI Presence variable is only general and is 
dependent on the mix of design features currently in place. Its effects are subject to change with the 
shuffling of the different design features it comprises of. It is therefore important to delve deeper to 
ascertain the real effects of the design features that may be masked by the DI presence variable. 
 
Turning to the features of deposit insurance, referring to Tables 1.3-1.11, we find that all of the 
individual features of deposit insurance have their specific effects on the FSI variables. The individual 
effects of the different design features may differ from the effect of the overall package. It is the 
interaction of the effects of the individual design features that form the overall effect of deposit 
insurance. This is important in the issue of the optimal deposit insurance design. Understanding the 
different effects of the individual design features on financial soundness indicators can help us design the 
optimal package for overall bank soundness.  
 
In line with the baseline regressions, none of the deposit insurance design features matter for the liquidity 
ratio and the leverage ratio. It is therefore safe to say that deposit insurance has no effect on the level of 
capital a bank holds relative to its assets (at least non risk weighted assets) and on how liquid a banks 
asset portfolio is.  Most of the design features are also important for bank profitability. Although the 
general DI Presence variable was not statistically significant for bank asset quality as shown above, we 
find evience that the general DI variable had masked the true relationship between deposit insurance and 
bank asset quality since we find statistically significant relationships between the loan to asset ratio and 
some deposit insurance design features highlighted below.  
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The extent of deposit coverage by the deposit insurance system as well as covering inter-bank deposits 
does not affect any of the FSI’s. This outcome is shared by Boyd and Rolnick (1998) who piont out that 
covering interbank deposits or increasing coverage levels can both be good or bad, since they can cause 
moral hazard on one hand and fail the good purpose of deposit insurance on the other hand if they are not 
fully covered when partially covered depositors rush to withdraw deposits, precipitating a bank run as 
was highlighted by the Northern Rock bank run in the United Kingdom in 2008.  They may be ex-post 
measures, which only come into play after a crisis has occurred and so do not necessarily shape the 
behaviour of banks in good times. 
 
Like Beck (2002), we find that compulsory membership is bad for asset quality as it increases the 
amount of loans issued by banks relative to their assets and also bad for bank profitability since it 
reduces the return on average assets ratio. A voluntary membership requirement for banks into a deposit 
insurance system may help to differentiate good banks from bad ones and also serve as a signal to 
depositors and other market participants that a bank that decides to signs up is serious about safeguarding 
depositors’ funds and as such is prudent thereby aiding market monitoring and discipline. However , this 
is in contrast to best practices as shown in Garcia (1999). 
 
The coverage of foreign currency deposits increases the loan to asset ratio as well as reducing the return 
on average assets ratio. Clearly, some deposits in foreign currency are usually left for long periods with 
banks, enabling them to issue more long term loans relative to their assets as well as exposing them to 
exchange rate risks and possible loan maturity mismatch issues which could hurt profitability. Others 
may be “hot money” that exposes banks to the temptation to excessively expand balance sheets. 
 
The practice of coinsurance of deposits of deposits also has a negative effect on the profitability of banks 
as well as a negative effect on the asset quality. The intuition here may be that the cost of insuring 
deposits in borne in part by the depositors and in part by the banks themselves. This reduced 
responsibility creates a greater incentive and financial capability for the banks to increase the amount of 
risky loans issued which in turn dampens profits. Moreover small depositors (who constitute the greater 
part of total bank depositors) get punished for bearing the cost of insuring their deposits but are largely 
unable to effectively monitor their banks, especially in an regime of information asymmetry. This finding 
is in line with  Boyd and Rolnick (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt (2000) who both who recognise that small 
depsitors are ineffective  bank monitors and suggest that bank owners must bear the greater cost of 
deposit insurance instead. 
  
When banks make periodic payments into an established deposit insurance fund, the profitability of 
banks tend to decline. Bank profit levels perform better when there are no funds in place, even though 
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the deposit insurance system administrators can organise for the availability of funds relatively quickly 
should the need arise. Beyond a direct effect on profits, bank officials may have a greater incentive to 
lend more riskily when they know that there are funds in place awaiting a bank run. The funding of the 
deposit insurance system has no effect on the asset quality of banks. 
 
In the same light as above, the source of the funds for insuring deposits matter both for the asset quality 
and profitability of banks. When the funds for insuring deposits come jointly from the public sector and 
private sector, bank profitability tends downwards and the amount of loans banks issue tend to rise. The 
reverse is the case when the private sector alone provides the funds for insuring bank deposits. There is 
greater incentive to exploit public funds, it would appear. 
 
Who administers the deposit insurance system is important for bank profitability but not for asset quality. 
The profitability of bank is at risk, where the deposit insurance system is administered solely by the 
public sector (CENTADMIN) and where it is jointly administered by the public and private sector 
(JOINTADMIN). This is in concurrence with the point raised by Mishkin (2000) discussed in section 1 
above that the public sector manager tends to under price the risk premium banks pay for deposit 
insurance, giving the banks an incentive to treat deposit insurance as a put option on bank profits, and to 
maximize their put options. Although we were statistically unable to study the effects of a privately 
administered system, it is safe to assume that a better option is a deposit insurance system that is funded 
and administered solely by private sector agents like the case of Germany, as surveyed in Beck (2002).  
 
We notice in our findings that in all cases where the design features were found significant, some of their 
effects gave rise to an increase in bank loan relative to assets alongside a corresponding decrease in bank 
profits (possibly from the majority of the loans issued going bad), suggesting that the inclusion or 
exclusion of the design features do create the incentive for banks to take on more risk. Therein lies the 
crux of the deposit insurance – moral hazard issue as mentioned by most researchers. However knowing 
which design feature to include or exclude from a deposit insurance system, can help get rid of the moral 
hazard problem and achieve and achieve a safe and efficient deposit insurance system for financial 
stability. 
 
Concerning the control variables, all the financial variables are entered by their first lags. As expected, 
the faster the growth rate of loans, the higher the ratio of loans to assets of banks. The net interest margin 
increases bank profitability but lowers the ratio of capital relative to bank assets, hence the capital 
adequacy of banks.  An increase in the return on assets causes an increase in the ratio of loans issued by 
banks relative to their total assets. This is not surprising, since the banks will have more funds available 
to lend. The higher the amount of liquid assets held by a bank, the higher the ratio of capital to assets 
(they both indicate prudence) but the return on assets diminishes as liquid asset are lower yielding. The 
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higher the capital adequacy of a bank, the lower the loan to asset ratio, increasing the bank’s asset 
quality. Again, both indicate a prudent approach. 
 
Turning to macro variables, there is slight evidence that banks in more developed countries tend to lend 
more relative to their assets and are still more profitable than banks in poorer countries. However, 
countries with a more developed financial system tend to lend less relative to their total assets. This is 
interesting and perhaps draws attention to the fact that countrywide development as indicated by a high 
GDP per capita does not necessarily mean financial system development, as is the case in many 
emerging market countries. Or alternatively, it highlights the greater availability of securities as 
alternative assets to loans, Banks in countries with high GDP growth rates tend to have higher loan to 
asset ratios. This buttresses the point above.  
 
The higher the rate of inflation, the more profitable banks become as the return on their assets increase, 
perhaps due to the benefit of zero interest current accounts that rises with inflation. As real interest rates 
rise, the loan to asset ratios of banks tend to increase as well. This may be because the banks know they 
can lend for better rates and so move to lend more. 
 
It is important to mention that from the regressions, bank liquidity and capital adequacy are not explained 
by any of the macroeconomic variables.  The level of liquidity is explained only by its lag and the 
amount of loans issued by the bank relative to its assets, while the leverage ratio is explained by its lag, 
the level of liquidity in a bank and the net interest margin. 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
The effect a deposit insurance system has on the banking system has been a subject of concern for policy 
makers and researchers in recent times. This study has sought to assess systematically how the present 
design package of deposit insurance has affected bank risk taking activity and to ascertain the individual 
effects of the different design features on bank risk. Our results suggest that the presence of a deposit 
insurance system does not affect the level of liquidity and the capital adequacy of banks. Instead, the 
presence of a deposit insurance system mainly affects bank risk through its relationship with the asset 
quality of banks as indicated by the total loans to total asset ratio and  bank profitability as captured by 
the return on average assets . 
 
We find also that the design features themselves have very different effects on the different financial 
soundness indicators, giving rise to suggestions for an optimal design package for deposit insurance, 
which is especially important in the face of the current economic situation that has left bank regulation at 
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a crossroad. All the design features of deposit insurance are relevant but based on our results, we identify 
those with significant importance and propose the following recommended features: 
1. Membership to the deposit insurance system is voluntary. 
2.  Foreign currency deposits are not covered. 
3.  Coinsurance of deposits is not practiced. 
3.  There are no ready funds in place awaiting an eventuality and banks are not allowed to make 
periodic payments into the deposit insurance system. However, the deposit insurance 
administrator is able to make funds available in good time when needed.  
4.  The funds required for insuring the deposits in banks are provided solely by the private sector. 
5.  The deposit insurance system is administered completely by the private sector. 
 
This research shows that good practices for deposit insurance is not simply a case of implicit or explicit 
deposit insurance but generally revolves around the five points mentioned above. However, we 
recommend that policy makers of different nations carry out studies aimed at determining the effects of 
the individual characteristics of deposit insurance on their banking systems before compiling their 
deposit insurance packages. These steps, added to ensuring that there is an efficient regulatory and 
supervisory system in place to check excesses will enable them enjoy the positive objectives of a deposit 
insurance system and ultimately help achieve banking system soundness. We also call for increased 
disclosure by banks on balance sheet data as the information provided will aid more research on bank 
soundness and stability. Further work needs to be done on the bank risk –deposit insurance debate.  
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Table 1 Financial Soundness Indicators: The Core and Encouraged Sets  
   
Core Set  
Deposit-takers   
Capital adequacy Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets 
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital 
Asset quality Nonperforming loans to total gross loans 
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans 
Earnings and profitability Return on assets  
Return on equity 
Interest margin to gross income 
Noninterest expenses to gross income 
Liquidity Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio) 
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 
Sensitivity to market risk Net open position in foreign exchange to capital 
Encouraged Set  
Deposit-takers Capital to assets 
Large exposures to capital 
Geographical distribution of loans to total loans 
Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital 
Gross liability position in financial derivatives to capital 
Trading income to total income 
Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses 
Spread between reference lending and deposit rates 
Spread between highest and lowest interbank rate  
Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans 
Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans 
Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities to total 
liabilities 
Net open position in equities to capital 
Other financial corporations Assets to total financial system assets 
Assets to GDP 
Nonfinancial corporations sector Total debt to equity 
Return on equity  
Earnings to interest and principal expenses 
Net foreign exchange exposure to equity 
Number of applications for protection from creditors 
Households Household debt to GDP 
Household debt service and principal payments to 
income  
Market liquidity Average bid-ask spread in the securities market1 
Average daily turnover ratio in the securities market1 
Real estate markets Residential real estate prices 
Commercial real estate prices 
Residential real estate loans to total loans 
Commercial real estate loans to total loans 
TABLE 1.2: BASELINE REGRESSION WITH DI PRESENCE VARIABLE ONLY 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 30
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
BANK 
VARIABLES 
    
0.7731 0.1435 0.0398 0.2414 LAG OF DEP. 
VARIABLE (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
0.0005 - 0.0075 0.0144 0.1243 LOANGRTH 
(0.017)∗∗ (0.191) (0.383) (0.647) 
- 0.0785 2.0513 - 0.3894 - 2.8210 INTMGNTA 
(0.793) (0.006)*** (0.676) (0.044)∗∗ 
NOT 1.2376 - 0.6961 - 7. 5714 LOANAST 
INCLUDED (0.285) (0.006)∗ (0.093) 
0.0029 NOT 0.0025 - 0.2423 ROAA 
 (0.026)∗∗ INCLUDED (0.812) (0.247) 
- 0.0002 -0.0113 NOT 1.5976 LIQUID 
(0.115) (0.000)*** INCLUDED (0.000)*** 
- 0.0003 - 0.0020 - 0.0032 NOT LEVRATIO 
(0.060)∗ (0.165) (0.684) INCLUDED 
MACRO 
VARIABLES 
    
0.0032 0.0853 - 0.0005 - 0.0861 STAGDEV 
(0.075)∗ (0.084)∗ (0.987) (0.871) 
- 0.0355 - 0.1190 0.0689 5.1727 STAGFINDEV 
(0.000)∗ (0.565) (0.823) (0.314) 
0.0026 0.0193 0.0033 0.0701 GDPGROWTH 
(0.000)*** (0.455) (0.760) (0.815) 
0.0007 0.3549 0.0003 0.0262  
INFLGROWTH (0.091)∗ (0.030)∗∗ (0.891) (0.784) 
0.0009 - 0.0164 - 0.0002 - 0.0295  
REALINTRATE 
(0.002)*** (0.368) (0.897) (0.110) 
0.0412 - 3.9677 0.0392 0.6379  
DI  (0.104) (0.000)*** (0.800) (0.909) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
78.34 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
43.0068 (0.001)*** 22.482(0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898(0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2184 (0.8270) 1.8708 (0.0614)* 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1.3: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - COVER 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
- 0.0292 - 0.2202 - 0.0067 - 1.1566  
COVER (0.591) (0.841) (0.973) (0.740) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
68.26 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
49.936 (0.001)*** 22.482 (0.0692) 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2340 (0.8149) 1.8708 (0.0614) 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
 
 
TABLE 1.4: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - MEMBER 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.0461 -3.9035 0.0384 0.8024  
MEMBER (0.074)∗ (0.000)*** (0.805) (0.889) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
78.44 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
43.2935 (0.001)*** 22.482(0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2166 (0.8285) 1.8708 (0.0614) 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1.5: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - FORCURR 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.0461 -3.9035 0.0384 0.8024  
FORCURR (0.074)∗ (0.000)*** (0.805) (0.889) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
78.44 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
43.293 (0.001)*** 22.482 (0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898(0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2166 (0.8285) 1.8708 (0.0614) 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.6: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - INTERBA 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
- 0.0292 - 0.2202 - 0.0067 - 1.1566  
INTERBA (0.591) (0.841) (0.973) (0.740) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
68.26 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)***  
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
42.936 (0.001)*** 22.482(0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898(0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2340 (0.8270) 1.8708 (0.0614) 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1.7: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY- 
COINSURE 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.1356 - 4.7185 - 0.0100 - 4.6415  
COINSURE 
 
(0.050)∗∗ (0.000)*** (0.971) (0.162) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
75.90 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
40.9567 (0.002)*** 22.482 (0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2337 (0.8152) 1.8708 (0.0614)* 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.8: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - FUND 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.0412 - 3.9677 0.0392 0.6379  
FUND (0.104) (0.000)*** (0.800) (0.909) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
78.34 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
43.0068 (0.001)*** 22.482 (0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2184 (0.8270) 1.8708 (0.0614) 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1.9: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - SOURCE 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.0511 - 5.2532 0.0527 1.1392  
SOURCE 0.048∗∗ 0.000*** 0.773 0.867 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
80.67 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
41.863 (0.001)*** 22.482 (0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2184 (0.8270) 1.8708 (0.0614)* 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
 
 
TABLE 1.10: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY- 
CENTADMIN 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.0346 - 3.8166 0.0426 1.2762  
CENTADMIN 0.192 0.001*** 0.797 0.837 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
78.34 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
43.0068 (0.001)*** 22.482 (0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2184 (0.8270) 1.8708 (0.0614)* 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1.11: REGRESSION WITH DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLE ONLY - 
JOINTADMIN 
 
DYNAMIC MODEL REGRESSIONS WITH GMM ESTIMATOR 
 
 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
 
 
GMM STYLE 
0.0784 - 4.9842 0.0009 - 4.1241  
JOINTADMIN 0.113 0.000*** 0.998 0. 214 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2571 2566 2570 2566 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
764 764 764 763 
WALD CHI2 
(P-VALUE) 
78.34 (0.0000)*** 98.98 (0.0000)*** 217965.26 
(0.000)*** 
4750.72 (0.0000)*** 
SARGAN (P-
VALUE) 
 
43.0068 (0.001)*** 22.482 (0.0692)* 9.434 (0.8023) 10.898 (0.6940) 
2nd ORDER AUTO- 
CORRELATIONS  
(p-value) 
0.2184 (0.8270) 1.8708 (0.0614)* 0.9180 (0.3586) 1.3773 (0.1684) 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. 
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TABLE 1.12: REGRESSIONS WITH DI ONLY& DESIGN FEATURE VARIABLES 
(Merged)* 
STATIC MODEL REGRESSION WITH OLS ESTIMATORS 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO  
REGRESSORS 
FIXED EFFECTS OLS 
DIFFERENCED 
TRANSFORMATION 
FIXED EFFECTS 
OLS 
DIFFERENCED 
TRANSFN 
FIXED EFFECTS 
OLS 
DIFFERENCED 
TRANSFN 
FIXED EFFECTS 
OLS 
DIFFERENCED 
TRANSFN 
BANK VARIABLES    
0.000892 - 0.0001104 0.0000153 - 0.000095 LOANGRTH 
(0.019)∗∗ (0.095) (0.067)∗ (0.976) 
- 0.0089583 2.616024 - 0.8626638 - 4.299621 INTMGNTA 
(0.977) (0.016)∗∗ (0.368) (0.004)*** 
NOT 0.07797682 - 1.826257 - 5.048402 LOANAST 
INCLUDED (0.595) (0.075)∗ (0.288) 
0.0005275 NOT - 0.044098 - 0.4129301 ROAA 
 0.591 INCLUDED (0.411) (0.077)∗ 
- 0.000309 - 0.0110297 NOT 1.447451 LIQUID 
(0.018)∗∗ (0.004)*** INCLUDED (0.000)*** 
- 0.0000122 - 0.0014695 0.0205951 NOT LEVRATIO 
(0.360) (0.257) (0.380) INCLUDED 
MACRO VARIABLES    
0.0035912 0.1463952 - 0.000236 -0.7658087 STAGDEV 
(0.194) (0.013)∗∗ (0.997) (0.604) 
- 0.0136444 0.0449682 1.209781 - 4.82296 STAGFINDEV 
(0.135) (0.850) (0.353) (0.374) 
0.0011917 0.0298306 0.0158093 - 1.11312 GDPGROWTH 
(0.027)∗∗ (0.252) (0.374) (0.055)∗ 
0.0011372 0.0841241 0.0106228 0.0644205  
INFLGROWTH (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.325) (0.482) 
0.0007812 - 0.0255057 - 0.0099366 0.049799  
REALINTRATE (0.003)*** (0.207) (0.293) (0.515) 
0.0258555 - 5.030522 - 0.2702676 0.4267514  
DI  (0.225) (0.000)*** (0.443) (0.936) 
- 0.0574423 - 1.785181 - 0.4032995 - 1.228124  
COVER (0.204) (0.132) (0.333) (0.848) 
0.0270586 - 4.923492 - 0.24897 0.421066  
MEMBER (0.210) (0.001)*** (0.455) (0.938) 
0.0270586 - 4.923492 - 0.24897 0.421066  
FORCURR (0.210) (0.001)*** (0.455) (0.938) 
- 0.1024357 - 0.9665577 - 0.3607111 - 5.518394  
INTERBA (0.026)∗∗ (0.385) (0.391) (0.464) 
0.0996379 - 4.714499 0.0526344 - 9.722172  
COINSURE 
 
(0.075)∗ (0.000)*** (0.756) (0.021)∗∗ 
0.0258555 - 5.030522 - 0.2702676 0.4267514  
FUND (0.225) (0.000)*** (0.443) (0.936) 
0.0627097 - 5. 233454 - 0.2681798 2.223395  
SOURCE (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.473) (0.698) 
0.0148398 - 5.00565 - 0.2481254 0.3668626  
CENTADMIN (0.525) (0.003)*** (0.478) (0.953) 
0.0711139 - 5.026416 - 0.3443523 0.6505993  
JOINTADMIN (0.104) (0.000)*** (0.398) (0.899) 
NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
2721 2721 2721 2721 
NUMBER OF 
BANKS 
770 770 770 770 
F TEST 
P-VALUE 
3.58(0.0001) *** 5.15(0.0000) *** 1.96(0.0296) *** 391.05(0.0000) *** 
R-SQ VALUE 0.08234 0.0755 0.0315 0.0433 
*, ** And *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. NOT INCLUDED is used where a variable is 
excluded from the regression because it is the dependent variable. Double lines means that values are from separate 
regressions 
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TABLE 1.13: DEPOSIT INSURANCE EFFECT SUMMARY 
 
ROBUST GMM SYSTEM REGRESSION OUTPUT  
VARIABLES 
LOANAST ROAA LIQUID LEVRATIO 
 
DI PRESENCE 
NS 
 
-VE 
 
NS NS 
 
COVER 
NS NS NS NS 
 
MEMBER 
+VE -VE NS NS 
 
FORCURR 
+VE -VE NS NS 
 
INTERBA 
NS 
 
NS 
 
NS NS 
 
COINSURE 
+VE -VE NS NS 
 
FUND 
 
NS 
-VE 
 
NS NS 
 
SOURCE 
 
+VE 
-VE 
 
NS NS 
 
CENTADMIN 
 
NS 
-VE 
 
NS NS 
 
JOINTADMIN 
NS -VE NS NS 
+VE represents a positive relationship, -VE means a negative relationship and NS stands for not significant. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1:  VARIABLE SUMMARY FOR CHAPTER 1  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Loangrth 3935 8.652829 260.086 -1073.463 15822.33 
Intmgnta 5654 .0349064 .0352432 -.182266 .5635452 
Loanast 5744 .4919097 .2243506 -.0788177 .9992812 
asquality 5704 .1710107 2.314625 -54.3 66.45 
roaa 5766 .9802827 3.567347 -48.79 73.17 
liquid 5780 .4713981 3.509758 -20.25 253 
levratio 5780 29.94412 255.7391 -142.1667 10067 
di 6398 .9659269 .1814313 0 1 
cover 6398 .3746483 .4840698 0 1 
member 6398 .8952798 .3062165 0 1 
forcurr 6398 .719131 .4494588 0 1 
interba 6398 .2089716 .4066058 0 1 
coinsure 6398 .2821194 .4500663 0 1 
fund 6398 .8093154 .3928716 0 1 
source 6398 .7474211 .4345254 0 1 
centadmin 6398 .4434198 .4968272 0 1 
jointadmin 6398 .3155674 .4647778 0 1 
stagdev 6398 13.43958 14.53078 .0864188 56.51267 
stagfindev 6048 .5925351 .4297858 .0125921 1.775119 
gdpgrowth 6398 2.161518 3.075388 -11.6639 11.04466 
inflgrowth 6397 -.1095589 4.270745 -28.88453 62.14408 
realintrate 5855 9.422948 11.59933 -82.45617 77.68432 
group 6398 33.15208 17.66453 1 62 
index 6398 457.5 263.8695 1 914 
      
 
Table A.2 Country coverage 
 
Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal. Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America and Venezuela. 
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Table A.3 GMM Style Instruments 
 
D.DI, D.LOANAST, D. LIQUID, D. ROAA, D.LEVRATIO, D.LOANGRRTH, D.INTMGNTA, 
D.STAGDEV, D.STAGFINDEV, D.GDPGRWTH D.INFLGRWTH D.REALINTRATE.  Here, (D) 
stands for the difference operator.  
 
